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ABSTRACT 
 
 The current thesis explores the possible consequences of the compliance of 
Greek natural gas market with the European legislation, proposed by the Greek Third 
Bailout Package of August 2015. The transformation of the EU energy systems is 
largely based on the use of gas for power production, while there is an increasing 
dependence on external suppliers. The new law (4336/2015) provides for the 
abolishment of the existing exclusive rights of the distribution companies (EPAs) to 
supply and operate their respective distribution systems. The supply of Eligible 
Customers by the EPAs will not be regulated in terms of prices, while it will need to 
comply with the provisions of a supply license and a supply code approved by the 
Regulatory Authority for Energy. While the theoretical background for the 
liberalization includes low gas price and cost reduction at the companies operating on 
the gas market as its goals, the experience of the gas price rises in the late 2000s, after 
the reforms were partially or fully implemented in other EU countries, and the quick 
rate in which the policies proposed have to be implemented, stand in front of the 
success of the measures included in the Package. 
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1. NATURAL GAS IN EUROPE 
1.1. Natural Gas European Market 
“It is clear today that at least for the next 20 years, natural gas will be a key 
energy vector for Europe, although since the economic crisis, gas consumption rates 
have fallen (Figure 1). Since 1996, gas is the second primary energy source for 
Europe after oil, accounting for a quarter of total consumption. In certain countries, 
like Germany, Italy, United Kingdom or Spain, gas consumption has been rising since 
the 1980s; only in France, among the larger economies, has its share remained steady 
at a little over 10%. The reasons behind the rise in gas consumption and the related 
infrastructure investment, are generally based on the following factors” (Gilardoni, 
2008): 
1. Economic. “The economic determinants are related to the more efficient electricity 
production processes; CCGT plants (the most widely used technology) can achieve at 
least 55–60% efficiency compared with 35–40% for traditional thermal plants. Given 
the gas prices up to 2004, gas was an economic way to produce electricity; now, after 
the price increases seen in the years 2005–2007, other vectors are less expensive, 
though the situation can vary from company to company and country to country. Last 
but not least, the lower emission levels associated with gas mean that there is no 
obligation to purchase both green and grey certificates, with evident savings in the 
overall cost of production.” 
2. Environmental. “The environmental factors are mainly related to atmospheric 
emissions. While emissions are not zero, they are certainly lower than the 
corresponding releases of other vectors like oil or coal. In Europe, the emissions 
intensity of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
from conventional thermal power plants have decreased substantially since 1990, 
particularly in the case of SO2 and NOx. This is primarily due to a decline in the use 
of coal, and the replacement of old, inefficient coal plants with newer or gas-fired 
ones. Rising overall electricity consumption has acted to partly offset the 
environmental benefits from improvements in emissions intensity. While CO2 
intensity has decreased, CO2 emissions increased in real terms by around 8% between 
1999 and 2004.” 
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Following the above mentioned aspects, in specific countries (such as Italy with 
the so-called Cip 6) the construction of gas-fired plants was subsidized, with the result 
of an even stronger push to changeover away from filthy carriers. 
“The consequence is that, today, one third of European gas consumption is for 
power generation. From 2000 to 2010 the use of gas for this purpose was doubled, 
having reached an annual 200 bcm. Italy and Spain are the recent leaders in the race 
for gas, but Germany and UK were already present in this sector in the late 1990s and 
they are now heavy consumers” (Gilardoni, 2008). 
 
Figure 1.1. Natural gas consumption, net imports and production in EU-27, 2011-
2014 (Eurostat, 2015). 
European gas market evolved to a more dynamic one during the past years as a 
consequence of supply and demand developments. Due to the economic crisis, gas 
consumption has decreased, gas origin changed massively, and as a result Europe 
moved closer to international gas markets. In the past two years imports of gas 
pipelines have declined, while imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) advanced to 11 
billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2009 and 18 bcm in 2010. In between 2008 and 2010, 
long-distance pipeline gas (LDPG) lost an amount of 10 billion cubic meters, a fact 
that reflects a market proportion loss of approximately 2%.  
It is a common belief that this volatility derived from an excess of LNG 
supply, which led to cheap spot market prices. Which is the cause of the excess 
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supply of LNG? Three factors: a decrease of natural gas demand due to economic 
crisis; a decrease of U.S. natural gas demand as a result of shale gas boost; and new 
LNG sufficiency that evolved in Qatar. 
Global natural gas markets are evolving, mainly because of the exploration of 
shale gas in North America. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) turned markets 
progressively more global since transportation cut off significantly from pipelines. 
New resources around or from Europe such as shale gas and other unusual sources 
grew to main suppliers. Along with internal market diversification, these evolutions 
could ease concerns about dependency on natural gas imports. However, due to the 
new phase of natural gas exploration it is still hazy when these unconventional 
resources will turn compelling. As conventional natural gas production minimizes, 
Europe will inevitably depend more and more on substantial gas imports in addition 
to its own natural gas production and possible domestic shale gas exploitation. 
“During the next few years, as European gas prices decrease, producers and importers 
have an opportunity to brace for the expected bust by adjusting now for the coming 
shifts. Regional suppliers and municipal utilities should also anticipate tougher 
competition in the years ahead. Those who want to come out on top must transform 
their existing business models” (ATKearney, 2011; EU, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.2. Monthly nominal natural gas prices (US Henry Hub, Europe, Japan, 
2005-2015 (August) (NGI’s Bidweek Survey & World Bank, 2015). 
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1.2. The Case for the Liberalization of Natural Gas Markets 
In any economic zone, a variety of transactions happens, compromising of 
various transactions of goods and services. Gas markets in the European continent 
rely on plurality of transactions. Applying the transaction cost scheme to gas markets 
depends upon spotting the most suitable business deals and their governance modes. 
The swap of natural gas and associated services takes place through numerous forms 
of deals, which structure the transactions through the gas value chain, while diverse 
modes of governance apply. “Some are related to spot market trading and are 
organised in the form of a market. Other contracts are bilateral and show a hybrid 
mode of governance. Historically, European natural gas imports were based on long- 
term take-or-pay contracts including a destination clause which prohibited re-export 
of imported gas” (Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2005). “Another variant of 
bilateral contracts are inter-firm ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) deals on the wholesale 
level. OTC is the term used to describe trades which are customised confidentially 
between the parties concerned – in contrast to open-market trades which are 
standardised and priced transparently” (Wright, 2006). Different contract forms set 
the baselines of the access to the distribution or transmission networks. The package 
of contracts describing these transactions is also called the tariff system and balancing 
regime. “On the retail side, consumer end-user contracts determine the terms of 
conditions applied. Depending on the consumer group, contracts and their modes of 
governance vary. Whereas companies organise their transactions with residential 
consumers in the form of classical contracts, industrial consumers tend to apply 
neoclassical contract law in order to accommodate flexibility in demand and supply 
changes. Natural gas markets fall within the group of network industries. A significant 
factor is that the exchange of gas and related services requires a gas network, import 
facilities (LNG terminals, regasification plants) and, on the production side, export 
(pipelines, a liquefaction entity and LNG export terminals) and production (upstream) 
facilities. In the context of the European gas market reform, the network for gas 
transport is subjected to reform and therefore of most significance. To a certain 
extent, transactions and their attributes within a sector resemble one another. Based on 
this, we argue that a portfolio of a sufficient number of identical, or very similar, 
transaction attributes allows one to use a sector argument here. Below, these attributes 
will be evaluated with regard to asset-specificity, uncertainty and frequency” (Haase, 
2009). 
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It is commonly accepted that asset-specificity refers to the relative inability to 
transfer assets meant for a specific use in a certain transaction to other uses. It is 
presumed that extremely unique assets serve as sunk costs that have relatively little 
importance beyond their use in the context of a specific transaction. Glachant (2002) 
considers that four of the six variants of asset specificity outlined above are most 
relevant when analysing network industries. 
It must be noted that site specificity influences gas transport and natural gas 
production assets. This kind of assets are stable, their set-up or relocation costs are 
immense and, therefore, relocation is not a feasible option. Once a network is 
implemented, this particular asset will be needed for one and single purpose. “Some 
authors claim site specificity can be reduced by the attribution of access and 
connection rights, or by the regulated construction of additional facilities”. Parallel 
pipeline systems are occasionally budgetary as the capacity demand is not frequently 
plentiful to explain an additional pipeline. While third party access can minimize site 
particularity, it may not reduce to the same way the incumbent’s desire to vertically 
combine every part of the gas value chain commencing with production, via 
transportation, storage and processing to consumer supply. 
“The degree of dedicated asset specificity depends heavily on the individual 
relationship. There are certainly transactions between large industrial users and gas 
companies for which dedicated pipelines exist; meaning that the pipeline connection 
between the two companies is exclusive. If the industrial user decides to switch fuels 
from natural gas to say coal, then the pipeline becomes unnecessary and the asset 
owner is faced with a stranded asset. In other words, the extent of dedicated asset 
specificity depends on the network characteristics in relation to the consumer base. 
However, production and transport facilities often enjoy a broader consumer base. 
Overall, dedicated specificity is, on average, somewhat semi-specific in gas markets” 
(Haase, 2009). 
Physical and materialistic particularities are also applicable. Before the EU gas 
reform, networks were not initially structured for adjustable commerce within Europe. 
Concerning physical specificity, operability from many different players of natural 
gas grids has been crucial. Physical specificity even nowadays demonstrates a 
significant role in minimizing harmonisation barriers. As an example, different gas 
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qualities enforce problems of technical nature. Glachant (2002) specifically says that 
“physically specificity can be neutralised by the regulatory establishment of 
interoperability standards and norms, or via a legal obligation to ensure entry- and 
exit-points linking interconnection flows”. Even though the Third Energy Package 
(2009) tries to implement a common European grid code this has not been able until 
now. Narrow natural gas storage abilities are still a challenge for a proper 
management of gas flows which are crucial in order to balance supply with demand. 
Each step taken in order to accommodate many different players, implied by market 
liberalization, perplexes the gas flow management and boosts temporal specificity. 
Glachant notes in this respect “temporal specificity can be attenuated by designating 
an accredited controller to synchronise the flows”. “A transmission system operator 
can reduce but not remove the temporal specificity that characterizes gas transport. 
European gas markets thus continue to demonstrate high physical and temporal 
specificities” (Haase, 2009). 
Brand-name capital and human asset specificities are, according to Glachant, 
low. “Although natural gas differs in quality by origin and by trader, it is certainly not 
a commodity comparable with branded products. Gas companies do not generate 
capital on the basis of their brand but by their geographical availability.” Haase 
(2009) states that “human asset specificity has some relevance for the gas sector. 
Highly educated staff are required to handle the network, be it to balance gas flows or 
to trade gas on the wholesale level. In comparison, the transport of gas requires much 
more sector- and asset- specific knowledge than, for instance, milk. Before 
liberalization, only a very few people had access to the details of the gas network and 
tariffs. At that time, gas flows, capacities, in- and out- take points were strategic 
knowledge. Later, the reform aimed to broaden the knowledge base through the help 
of a set of third-party access measures. The availability of a sufficient number of 
specifically trained people such as engineers with expertise in oil and gas projects is 
crucial. Whereas exploration, production, construction and maintenance areas face 
difficulties in attracting certain technical staff in sufficient numbers, and at reasonable 
cost, other branches of the business do not face shortages. However, since the current 
shortage of staff might be only a cyclical problem, we consider European gas markets 
to be moderate in terms of human specificity. To sum up, there are ways in which 
certain specificities can be reduced at the expense of higher transaction costs. The 
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European Unions’ attempt to establish a European grid code, and to harmonise 
balancing markets, may be seen as an effort to reduce physical and temporal 
specificities. This effort necessitates greater collective coordination and monitoring. 
The most significant asset specificity in terms of characterising transactions in 
European gas markets is site specificity. Investments in transmission and distribution 
networks, storage and in gas production and exploration remain highly site specific. 
The provision of capital for these investments is dependant on whether exposure to 
potential hazards can be safeguarded against, for instance by agreeing long-term 
supply contracts.” 
For this reason, Haase (2009) argues that “contract flexibility has its 
limitations. Contract flexibility involves at least three dimensions: long term versus 
short term, small volume versus large volume, and the agreed price parameter. Given 
the site specificity, any investing party has to accommodate price, volume and time 
risks. In opting for a market-based mode of governance, rather than a hierarchical 
form involving vertically integrated companies, a dilemma related to collective action 
is added” (Haase, 2009).  
The frequency of gas sector transactions may vary significantly depending on 
the type of transaction. Nonetheless, transactions which deal with natural gas trading 
and transport do happen frequently. Alterations of the environment or unpredictable 
behavioral changes by the gas chain players may produce uncertainty. Environmental 
uncertainty in the European gas markets is usually referred to evolutions that may 
affect supply and demand. Despite of the existence of multiple and complicated 
supply and demand models, geopolitical, political or economic changes may 
dramatically diversify the whole picture. Restructure of the energy sector after the oil 
crisis during 1975 makes a very good example. Each company and country has to 
make sure that purchased gas volumes have to be delivered at the agreed price. 
Energy price volatility is a huge environmental anxiety since natural gas prices are 
linked to oil prices. Behavioral uncertainty also plays a major role. The literature 
mainly refers to the bond between the investing companies and the regulatory 
authority. “Companies face the threat that, after they have made huge investments in 
production or network facilities, the regulatory authority could change the regulatory 
framework in such a way that the investment fails to provide an adequate return. Once 
the firm has made the investment, it is effectively locked into a contract with the 
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regulator and thus runs the danger that the investment fails to return a profit. 
Transaction cost economics would view the regulator as behaving opportunistically if 
it changed the rules of the game or the contract ex post in its favor because the 
company is dependent and locked in by its investment. This specific form of 
uncertainty is also referred to as regulatory uncertainty” (Spanjer, 2007). “It is 
perceived to be a structural problem that may result in a delay or withholding of an 
investment decision” (Haase, 2009). 
According to Glachant and Finon (2004), “two concurrent market theories 
influence the difference of opinions of economists on unbundling, which stands at the 
core of the liberalization of the natural gas market”: 
1. “The standard market theory considers that the number of players and competition 
at different levels of the natural gas value chain determine the players’ conduct and 
the efficiency of the markets (Armstrong et al., 1994; Newbery 2001a). This suggests 
that commercial activities must be horizontally disintegrated among significant 
market players. Organisation of the interface between different parts of the value 
chain limits the exercise of market power by incumbents. This suggests a clear 
separation of commercial activities from the transmission system operation. Secondly, 
vertical integration between import/wholesale supply and retail supply under a 
hierarchical structure must be limited in order to limit entry barriers.” 
2. “A model of virtual competition proposed by the theory of contestable markets 
(Baumol et al., 1982) considers that, rather than structural conditions, the technical 
and jurisdictional conditions allow a credible competitive threat and virtual 
competition. The main objective of competition could be better reached by 
suppressing legal and technical barriers to entry. A credible threat of entry exerted by 
foreign competitors that are incumbents in their adjacent national markets would lead 
to effective allocation. In other words, industrial structures – horizontal concentration 
and vertical integration of import/wholesale supply and retail supply – might be 
preserved if non-discriminatory access to grids is guaranteed to the incumbents´ 
potential competitors with a complete unbundling of the networks.” 
Willner (2003) and later Bjoerkroth et al. (2006) came to the conclusion that 
“liberalization would have no need to bring more contribution than a welfare-
maximizing public monopoly, if the gas industry remained imperfectly competitive. 
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Liberalization could come about either by market consolidation or deepening 
horizontal integration, which ultimately could bring higher prices and a transfer of 
strategic decision-making into the hands of a limited number of large companies. The 
intended opening of the market to new suppliers would become more difficult, and 
further regulation would be needed.” Newbery (2001b) pointed to “proactive antitrust 
policies with the goal of resisting the power of vertically and horizontally integrated 
firms.” 
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2. THE EUROPEAN UNION VISION 
2.1. Concept 
In order to increase the welfare of natural gas consumers, and in accordance 
with the talks about the efficiency of energy firms and the awaited rise of the 
European dependence on imports, European Union (EU) took the decision to allow 
the competition in national natural gas markets and to sum them into a unique 
liberalized European market for natural gas by taking advantage of the combined pan-
European network and the cooperation of the network operators. 
The EU states that unbundling is the main tool of vertically integrated market 
liberalization. At first, accounting unbundling took place, then functional and legal 
unbundling. In the past years, ownership unbundling was set as a suggestion by the 
European Commission. Legal unbundling leads to the segregation of the transmission 
system operator (TSO) and distribution system operator (DSO) as long as services 
with characteristics of a natural monopoly (transmission and distribution through gas 
networks) from the rest of the vertically integrated gas undertakings (VIU), above all 
from gas extraction and areas that may be affected by competition (import, wholesale 
and retail supplies). Unbundling’s main target was to refrain from expressing favour 
towards the vertically integrated supplier/trader and to make sure the equal non-
discriminatory access of third parties (TPA) to the existing gas infrastructure.  
Areas of the “commercial activities” such as gas import and supply were 
decided to be liberalized. From liberalization, EU expects that new 
shippers/traders/suppliers (including international players) will enter the 
wholesale/retail market, and consumers will eventually choose the one that suits them 
more. Competition between shippers/traders/suppliers should bring modernization, 
lower prices and step up the quality and diversity of the products and services being 
offered, including types and lengths of contracts between market players. “Market 
liberalization and integration should increase the security of supply through the 
diversification of sources and transport routes. Natural gas prices should be de-
coupled from oil prices and should be determined by matching demand and supply on 
newly established stock exchanges and secondary markets.” 
The section of naturally monopolistic network activities was scheduled to be 
regulated and brought to harmony. The EU took the initiative to form independent 
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national and supranational regulatory bodies, which will play the role of seting the 
rules of equal access and transparent price-setting taking into account 
transmission/distribution, and which will finally direct the inspection of the same by 
the gas network operators. “The EU anticipates that unbundled operators will secure 
fair access for competing shippers/traders/suppliers to the infrastructure, and that they 
will compete in attracting them (pipe-to-pipe competition of different transport routes 
should arise additionally to gas-to-gas competition in the commercial area). Network 
operators should aim to maximize the usage of network capacity, which should lead to 
the removal of bottlenecks; they should be motivated to invest in new 
interconnections, which will contribute to pan-European network integration.” 
in order to implement the above mentioned EU vision, Slabá (2008) uses the 
so-called “Structure-Conduct-Performance” model (SCP), defined by Scherer (1980). 
Scherer took the hypothesis that “the basic conditions influence the market Structure. 
Basic  conditions and market structure influence the conduct of market players, thus 
further determining the sector Performance. The consequences also run in reverse 
(e.g. performance influences the market structure, etc)” (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1. “Single liberalized EU Market for natural gas (EU vision – SCP 
Scheme)” (Slabá, 2008). 
1. Unbundling. “The separation of the competitive segments of the industry can take 
place to varying degrees and may concern both vertical and horizontal unbundling of 
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the gas chain. The mildest version of unbundling concerns the simple separation of 
accounts (accounting unbundling) of the former integrated utility. The strongest 
version of unbundling is ownership unbundling, which involves de-merging the 
different activities of the gas chain into separately owned companies. Legal 
unbundling implies that activities that were once integrated into the same firm are 
separated and assigned to new corporations whose shareholders are, however, the 
same as those who once controlled the former vertically integrated utility. Functional 
unbundling aims to keep management units completely separate within the same 
company. Ownership unbundling is necessary to ensure that operation of essential 
facilities is truly non-discriminatory, as emphasized by the European Commission in 
the conclusions of its recent market investigation. For example, a former integrated 
utility can be considered, affected by legal separation between its gas transmission 
network – an essential facility operated by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) – 
and gas purchase and resale activities which are potentially competitive. The principle 
of Third Party Access (TPA), implemented by an independent regulator, should 
ensure that no firm will be discriminated against while demanding access to the 
transmission network. However, investment decisions concerning network expansion 
still depend on the owner. They may be affected by potential strategic behaviour of 
the incumbent gas utility, restricting competition by preventing expansion of the 
transmission capacity needed by new entrants. Such a strategy may increase total 
profits of the incumbent due to its dominant position in the wholesale market, 
although the profits of its transmission subsidiary may be negatively affected. 
Regulation may deem these strategies to be abuses of dominant positions, but this is a 
weak solution compared to ownership unbundling requirements implemented by ex-
ante regulation (Cavaliere, 2007).” 
2. Third Party Access. By the term TPA we refer to non-discriminatory access and 
price-seting rules for the transmission network, the distribution network, the LNG 
plants and storage facilities. Specifically about networks, the first European directive 
allows countries to elect between regulated and negotiated TPA.  
 “Since in most EU countries the separation of the network from the 
competitive activities has been only partial (legal or accounting unbundling), the 
incumbent still retains the possibility of setting high network charges to competitors, 
reducing their ability to compete in the liberalized segments. Ensuring a non-
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discriminatory access to the network through a transparent and cost reflective tariff 
structure is therefore a crucial step in the implementation of the TPA principle” (Polo 
and Scarpa, 2003). 
3. Customer switching. Common knowledge often mixes market liberalization with 
market opening on the demand point of view, i.e. how many consumers are free to 
choose their supplier (Eligible Customers). 
 
2.2. Steps towards the implementation of liberalization 
2.2.1. Goals 
On January 1, 2009, the fears of many European policymakers were 
confirmed. After a payment dispute could not be resolved, Russia shut off natural gas 
supplies to Ukraine, leading to widespread gas disruptions across Europe. While this 
episode highlighted Europe’s vulnerability in the energy sector, concerns over the 
security of supply for natural gas had been existed well before 2009.  
Ever since the discovery of gas in the 1950s, it has played an overwhelming 
significant role in EU’s energy consumption. Due to certain irregular technological 
and economic features of natural gas as an energy resource, the market has always 
been uncompetitive and characterized by a limited number of suppliers, leading to 
security of supply concerns. In an attempt to change this, the European Commission 
began an effort to enact liberalization reforms in 1998 with one of three Directives. 
These Directives were designed to make the market more competitive and 
facilitate the entry of new suppliers into the market. The expected results of this are 
two-fold: lower prices for consumers, as well as increased energy security due to 
more options in suppliers. A quantitative analysis of EU documents shows that 
policymakers overwhelming believed that liberalization would increase energy 
security. However, after an examination of the three liberalization Directives using a 
mix of economic and qualitative data, there is little evidence that the legislation had 
positive effects on increasing competition and therefore energy security. Prices have 
increased, market concentration remains high, and customers are not switching 
suppliers. 
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Some of the examples include the Nabucco pipeline, and the Nord and South 
Stream pipelines. It appears that in the projects of Nabucco pipeline, Nord and South 
Stream pipelines, none of them included any of the main aspects of liberalization. 
 Natural gas was first used after World War II, and its share in Europe’s energy 
consumption has been increasing ever since. The first discovery of natural gas 
occurred in the 1950s in the Po Valley in Italy, and in 1959, the Gronigen field was 
found in the Netherlands, and it continues to be Europe’s largest deposit of natural gas 
today. According to the International Energy Agency, natural gas comprised 3% of 
Europe’s energy consumption in 1965. That percentage rose to 20% in 2009, and the 
International Energy Agency predicts that by 2035, approximately 44 percent of 
Europe’s energy consumption will be natural gas. Thus, it is clear that natural gas will 
be part of an increasingly major part in achieving energy security in Europe.  
A large part of the concern about securing the supply of natural gas is that 
production occurs outside the borders of the EU. Russia holds 42 percent of the 
world’s gas reserves, followed by Norway (24%), Algeria (18%), Iran (15%), and 
Nigeria (3%) and Libya (2%). The EU imports about 47 percent of all gas it consumes 
each year, and this percentage is foressen to increase. 
In addition to the location of natural gas deposits, there are certain irregular 
technological and economic features of gas as an energy resource. Combined, these 
two elements create an inflexible and uncompetitive market that leads to security of 
supply concerns. 
 To discuss the gas market, it is necessary to divide it between the physical 
structure and the structuring of competition and the first influences the second. The 
physical structure of the natural gas market has three distinct sections: production, 
transmission and distribution. The production stage refers to when the gas is extracted 
from the ground and refined into a usable product. It is obvious, but necessary, to 
mention that producers are constrained by the fact that gas is a natural resource; firms 
simply cannot choose to produce natural gas. In the second stage, gas is transferred, 
primarily via pipeline, to the customer, and it is then locally distributed in the end-
user country as the third step in the process. The vast majority of natural gas – 
approximately 80 percent – travels through pipelines that are extremely costly to 
build. For example, according to current steel prices, an average 400-km pipeline 
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would cost between $480 million to $770 million. Thus, natural gas differs from other 
energy sources such as oil, which can be bought, sold, and physically transferred with 
minimal difficulty.  
The production and distribution stages are both dependent on the expensive 
transmission network of pipelines. The physical structure influences the lack of 
competition in the natural gas market, namely that the market primarily uses long 
term contracts, is oligopolistic, and characterized by both vertical and horizontal 
integration. 
One of the features that has been consistently present in the natural gas market 
is long-term contracts. These contracts typically lock the buyer and seller into an 
agreement for a duration of around 25 years. The reason behind designing contracts 
this way is a result of the physical structure of the market. Due to the enormous start-
up infrastructure costs, companies building gas pipelines need to ensure that there will 
be guaranteed demand after the project is completed so that they are able to recoup 
their initial capital investments. These long-term contracts “tie suppliers and users 
together in a contractual relationship which is substantially insulated from outside 
competitive pressures.” The contracts are just one aspect of the limited competition in 
the gas market. 
Another barrier to a competitive market is that the supply side of the gas 
market is oligopolistic (see Glossary for definition). In the case of Europe, four 
companies – Gazprom (Russia), Sonatrach (Algeria) and GFU (Norway) and Gasunie 
(Netherlands) – are responsible for supplying 87.7 percent of natural gas imports 
(Figure 2.1). Again, it is the physical structure of the market that affects how 
competitive it is. Since companies cannot simply choose to produce natural gas, once 
a company establishes itself in a region where there are gas deposits, it enjoys a 
natural monopoly on that particular field. Clearly, the supply of gas existing in the 
hands of a few companies is not conducive towards competition (Yu, 2011). 
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Figure 2.1. EU natural gas imports by source, 2014-15 (Eurostat, 2015). 
The other relationship between physical structure and competition is how the 
transmission stage affects vertical and horizontal integration. In the case of natural 
gas, there is widespread vertical integration between the production stage and 
transmission stage. 
A company is not going to extract natural gas without being assured of the 
existence of a transmission network to transfer their product to the end consumer. 
Likewise, companies are not going to enter the transmission stage and invest billions 
in pipeline infrastructure if there is no guarantee there will be natural gas to transport. 
Thus, there is an incentive for firms to integrate vertically to assure the success of 
both stages. Much of the rationale for Standard and Poor upgrading Gazprom’s credit 
rating from negative to stable in 2010 is due to the presence of vertical integration. 
However, while it may be beneficial to Gazprom, it does not promote competition and 
the lower prices and increased energy security that follow. 
Furthermore, the structure realities of the gas market also favor horizontal 
integration. As input and infrastructure costs for building the transmission networks 
are extremely high, they are “both difficult and uneconomical to duplicate.” If there 
are two firms operating two different transmission routes, and one of the companies 
wants to start transporting gas over the other firm’s route, a merger is a more likely 
option than laying down identical pipeline. The physical structure of the gas market, 
specifically the need to link the production and transmission stages, influences the 
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integration of firms, both vertically and horizontally. This lack of competition, as seen 
in long-term take or pay contracts, oligopolistic nature of the market, and the 
tendency for firms to integrate, explains a great deal of Europe’s desire to enact 
liberalization reforms. Making the problem of an uncompetitive market severe is that 
of the few number of gas suppliers, most of the supplying firms are owned by 
politically unstable and unfriendly states (Yu, 2011). 
From its inception, the European Union has lacked the strength necessary to 
ensure the effective implementation of its policy goals and regulatory efforts. The 
nature of the European Union, a federation of independent nations governed by a 
central authority, inherently creates the breeding grounds for an environment rife with 
divergent ideologies regarding energy policy, for example: 
“In the past the natural gas industry in the European countries was typically 
characterized by vertically integrated state-owned companies and public monopolies 
operating both on the upstream and the downstream markets (Ivanova, 2012). The 
process of liberalising the EU gas market, which can be traced back to the 1980s, has 
been extremely slow, mostly due to the fact that neither the founding EEC Treaty 
(1957) nor the Maastricht Treaty (1992) provided the Community with the 
competence to develop energy policy. Hence any legislative action, which could be 
interpreted as an attempt to develop such a policy, ran the risk of being perceived by 
the EU Member States as lacking legitimacy. This explains the Community’s 
decades-long quest for a formal treaty-based competence in the energy sector.” Each 
country maintained its own distinct approach to meeting its energy needs and was 
reticent to place its power in the hands of an overarching European energy regulatory 
agency. 
Moreover, power within the EU was concentrated in the hands of a few energy 
firms that wielded a significant amount of power and could simply ignore action taken 
by the EU. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the EU consisted of independent 
national gas and electricity markets dominated by state-run energy firms. Each 
country maintained its own internal market that was controlled by a state-run energy 
company. These firms managed and operated most, if not all, levels of the production 
and distribution chain. 
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For example, network operators perform the same time as suppliers. Vertical 
integration of gas companies defined the structure of European energy markets. These 
powerful energy firms not only discovered, produced, and compressed the gas, but 
they also ran its transmission and storage. Additionally, they distributed the final 
product to wholesale and retail suppliers, thus controlling every aspect of energy 
production, from the extraction of petroleum out of the ground to its conversion and 
eventual receipt by electricity companies. Sometimes these energy conglomerates 
even ran the companies that converted these resources and also the electricity 
companies that provided electricity to consumers. Because they administered every 
aspect of the distribution of electricity and natural gas to consumers, these firms had 
monopolies in the market and could dictate prices at their sole discretion. This also 
resulted in some instances of inefficiency within the utility structure, as no competing 
forces existed to motivate these state energy firms to improve their processes 
(Duncan, 2015). 
In what has been deemed the “pre-liberalization phase” from 1990–1996, the 
EU came to recognize the exigency of removing power from the hands of these 
energy firms and opening the market to additional participants. During this time, a 
debate evolved between theoretical and practical economists in order to step up the 
amount of how effective the utilities are. Suggestions for privatization and 
liberalization were made. Nevertheless, European government officials understood 
that it was not simply enough to voice their pursuit of a policy of economic 
liberalization. 
Rather, the actual substantive structure of corporate ownership of energy 
conglomerates needed to change, which would only occur with the introduction of a 
novel legal and market structure to govern these companies and help them move away 
from the current system of vertical integration. European energy officials made it their 
vision to stop the monopoly in the commercial activities of supply and import, to 
break the limits in the gas trade between national markets, and to strengthen the free 
access of the third parties to gas networks. As a result, in an attempt to break the 
monopolistic influence of the energy firms, European energy officials turned to the 
regulatory bodies and rules of the EU and began to change their framework. It would 
not be until the late 1990s, however, until the EU would start implementing changes 
within the EU’s internal market (Duncan, 2015). 
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The first action taken by the EU in this informal pursuit of market 
liberalization was the creation of the Energy Charter Treaty (the Treaty). The goal of 
the Treaty, which was signed and ratified in 1994 by fifty-one signatories located both 
within and outside the EU, was to create a legal framework dedicated to the 
promotion of lasting international collaboration in the energy sector. The act was an 
attempt to open the European market to third-party players. For example, contracting 
parties were required to encourage and create stable, favorable and transparent 
conditions for foreign investors and apply the most-favored nation principle or offer 
the exact treatment that is granted to domestic investors, no matter which deal is 
favoured the most. Additionally, the Treaty laid out specific dispute resolution 
procedures for disagreements occurring between companies within the nation, and 
also cross-border disputes between an external company from a foreign country and 
the host state within the EU. The Treaty also set forth rules governing competition, 
transparency, and sovereignty within the host state. Specifically, countries were to 
enable competition between outside companies and internal, state-run monopolists by 
combating market distortions and barriers through legal provisions geared to address 
any unilateral or concerted anti-competitive behaviour in economic activities in the 
energy sector. Additionally, host countries within the EU were mandated to foster 
transparency by creating a central regulatory body to handle inquiries from foreign 
and third-party investors. 
Finally, host countries subject to the contract were to maintain ownership of 
their resources and conduct operations in accordance with international law. Despite 
the positive operations set forth by the Treaty, it still lacked the force necessary to 
prompt any real change within the European internal market. It did not specify any 
punitive measures for host countries that failed to follow the Treaty’s terms and 
appeared to be mainly prescriptive. There was no real impetus for countries to follow 
the Treaty. Furthermore, it pointed to international law as the source of host countries’ 
sovereignty, further weakening the Treaty’s appeal among its signatories. 
Nevertheless, this Treaty set the wheels in motion for the creation of three energy 
directives by the EU that would put the internal European energy market on the path 
to change (Duncan, 2015). 
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2.2.2. The First Energy Directive 
 Following the introduction of the Treaty, the EU then turned and truly focused 
on the liberalization of its internal market. It did so through the creation of three 
electricity and gas directives. The first set of liberalization directives (the First 
Directive) was adopted in 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (gas); these directives focused 
mainly on pointing out areas where competition could truly exist, and facilitated 
competition in those areas. The directives also identified areas that naturally 
supported monopolies and would require a different approach in the process of 
economic liberalization. A global approach was not taken to drastically implement 
implementation, but rather, the EU identified areas that would naturally be more 
receptive to the opening of the market and attempted to target those first. 
The EU knew that many of the energy conglomerates would resist the entrance 
of third-party participants in the energy market and use their dominant positions to 
exclude them. As a result, the Community legislator instituted the Third Party Access 
system, in order to ensure that vertically integrated operators would not disfavor new 
entrants or construct other entry obstacles. One of the predominant features of the 
First Directive, however, was its identification of the risk posed by monopolies and its 
institution of separation policies to unbundle vertical conglomerates. 
Transmissions companies could now choose from whom they received their 
energy and were no longer beholden to the state conglomerates. An additional feature 
of the First Directive that sets it apart is that the only unbundling that it authorized 
was accounting and management unbundling for electricity and accounting 
unbundling for gas. It forced the state conglomerates to abolish their vertical 
integration only in these areas. However, although insufficient to trigger any real 
change, the First Directive proved to be a step in the right direction. 
Although the First Directive brought many benefits and was the first real step 
towards bringing regulatory change to the European internal market, it soon became 
clear that the requirements were inadequate. The Commission of the European Union 
launched a series of studies demonstrating that Member States were still 
discriminating against third-party market players and catering to the state-run 
conglomerates.38 The First Directive simply had not been forceful enough or 
suggested enough change to precipitate any real change in the market (Duncan, 2015). 
 26 
 
 
2.2.3. The Second Energy Directive 
As a result, the EU proposed and set in motion a Second Directive package 
(the Second Directive). The main goals of this second package were to strengthen the 
unbundling requirements on network operators, to strengthen the rights of access to 
the networks, to remove the remaining exclusive supply rights and to establish 
independent sectoral regulators. Whereas the First Directive had focused on 
transmissions operators not discriminating amongst the available suppliers rather than 
general structural change in the market, the Second Directive instead wanted to level 
the playing field for third-party suppliers and companies. 
With the First Directive, the emphasis was placed on the behavior of the 
transmissions companies. After the implementation of the First Directive, however, 
the European Union recognized that transmissions companies and operators would be 
recalcitrant to change. 
The Commission realized that it needed to erase any distinction between gas 
flows coming from both within the host state and abroad. Specifically, the 
Commission wiped out the notion of transit and guaranteed the same treatment to all 
gas flows inside the EU, regardless of being cross-border(s), by ensuring regulated 
third-party access to all transmission networks on the basis of tariffs (or 
methodologies) approved by national regulatory authorities. The 2003/55/EC Gas 
Directive that was part of the second package gave third parties a legal right to non-
discriminatory access to transmission and distribution systems and to LNG facilities. 
Conversely, the Commission ordered that system operators were not allowed to 
provide preferential treatment to one company over another and they had to make sure 
non-discriminatory and transparent access to the system for all users. The EU was 
tackling the problem from both sides of the production chain. 
Furthermore, whereas with the First Directive the EU had ordered that only 
the companies’ accounting functions needed to be unbundled, with the Second 
Directive the EU ordered that the transmission, distribution, production, and supply 
activities had to be completely separated and unbundled. It also instituted an 
additional layer of change through its imposition of consumer protection regulations. 
Rules were created that guaranteed consumers items such as the right to change 
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supplier, transparent contract conditions and dispute settlement mechanisms. No 
longer were consumers to be at the mercy of their suppliers. They were to be 
guaranteed a secure supply delivered on a timely, reasonable basis. The Second 
Directive also established a baseline for the quality and price that consumers would 
receive. Finally, the Commission set a firm timetable within which it sought to 
guarantee the arrival of the market to full competition. 
 The most important part of the Second Directive package, however, lay in its 
designation of transmission and distribution system operators and regulatory 
authorities within each Member State. Each entity was given specific tasks that they 
were to be responsible for in order to facilitate the move towards internal market 
liberalization. For instance, transmission system operators were to be responsible for 
guaranteeing long-term capacity for meeting the electrical needs of each Member 
State. They were also placed in charge of monitoring other interconnected systems 
and gauging the needs of their particular Member State based on their observations. 
Transmission system operators also were responsible for policing potential instances 
of discrimination and serving as an information source for system users. Distribution 
operators, on the other hand, were tasked more with the efficient allocation of 
resources. Like transmission system operators, they were responsible for policing 
discrimination and ensuring reliability and security within the distribution system. 
However, they were separately tasked with procuring the energy they use to cover 
energy losses and reserve capacity in their system according to transparent, non-
discriminatory and market-based procedures. Distribution officers needed to ensure 
that their respective systems were being run in the most efficient way possible. This 
act also created a position for independent regulators within each Member State that 
were responsible for “monitoring respect of the non-discrimination principle, the level 
of transparency and competition, and the tariffs and methods for calculating them 
(Duncan, 2015). 
Clearly, the energy initiatives being taken by the EU were having little impact 
on the internal market. So, in yet another attempt to try to facilitate market 
liberalization, the Commission passed a third set of energy directives (the Third 
Directive). It adopted a fundamentally new approach aiming at changing the structure 
of the EU gas market and developed a third generation of new IEM legislative 
proposals, which would be capable of rectifying the problems identified by the 
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Inquiry. The EU’s hope with the passage of the third set of directives was that a 
majority of the states would finally begin to actually implement and enforce the 
regulations that the EU had been advancing for nearly a decade (Duncan, 2015). 
 
2.3.3. The Third Energy Directive 
Nevertheless, as with the previous two energy directives, some of the 
requirements seen in the Third Directive appeared nearly the same as the previous 
two. For example, the Commission re-emphasized that Member States needed to 
focus on unbundling, ensuring non-discrimination among suppliers, and guaranteeing 
equal access for customers. They were to do everything laid out in the Third Directive 
in order to “guarantee fair competition and appropriate consumer protection. In fact, 
some of the language from the Third Directive essentially mirrored that of the Second 
Directive. For instance, it ordered the pursuit of information unbundling, which had 
been referenced in the earlier directive. The Commission sought to ensure that 
information remained separate between the suppliers and network affiliates in order to 
bolster competition. Furthermore, the Commission tasked transmission system 
operators, distribution network operators, and regulatory authorities with the same 
responsibilities it had given them before. Transmission operators were responsible for 
monitoring the long-term energy needs of their respective states and ensuring the 
provision of adequate supplies, in addition to enforcing non-discrimination 
mechanisms and providing information to network users. Distribution network 
operators were tasked with ensuring the efficient distribution of resources at a 
regional level. 
National regulatory authorities, similarly, were to oversee the activities of both 
operators and ensure compliance with all aspects of the Third Directive. The Third 
Directive, however, differed from both the First and Second Directives through its 
requirement of greater accountability within the supply and distribution chain and 
among the operators and regulators. Unlike before, transmission system operators had 
to undergo an official certification process prior to being granted status as an official 
transmission system operator. Furthermore, transmission system operators were now 
responsible for submitting an annual report to the Commission describing the 
condition of their state’s system, in addition to outlining the parts of the infrastructure 
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that required either creation or renovation. Rather than operating in a vacuum, 
transmission system operators were now to report to the EU on the status of their 
enforcement of the Third Directive, in addition to mapping out the needs of their 
particular state. This new level of accountability was further bolstered by the 
guarantee of access rights of regulatory authorities to natural gas accounts. In the 
interests of enforcing unbundling provisions, energy companies were required to keep 
their various accounts and activities separate. Now, regulatory authorities had the 
ability to go in and make sure that these barriers were actually being enforced. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Third Directive was its outward 
focus on generating third-party competitors and its emphasis on cross-border issues. 
More than ever before, in accordance with its recently issued Priority Interconnection 
Plan, the Commission focused its efforts on generating activity across state borders 
and even pressuring non-EU countries to abide by the norms set forth in the Energy 
Directives. In this final, Third Directive, the Commission went so far as to present the 
methodology of how to push non-EU countries or companies to behave in respect to 
EU internal rules even when their own domestic market is concerned. 
“The EU understood that most of the Member States’ resources come from 
countries, predominantly Russia, that do not value market competition and directly 
hinder the EU’s efforts to bring more third-party competitors to the market. In order 
to stimulate third-party access, the Commission in this Directive ordered authorities in 
Member States to take measures to ensure that eligible customers can obtain access to 
upstream pipeline networks and organise a system of third party access to 
transmission and distribution systems” (Duncan, 2015). 
Specifically, the Commission changed from a point-to-point (PP) system for 
shippers to an entry-exit (EE) regime. With the PP system, every transaction occurs 
before natural gas inserts the transmission system, whereas with the EE system, 
transaction occurs after natural gas has inserted the transmission system, thus 
allowing for a greater number of independent traders to participate in the market 
based on the needs of downstream transmission companies. The Third Directive also 
brought the implementation of twelve pan-European Network Codes governing cross-
border transaction: “capacity allocation and excess management rules; balancing 
rules; rules concerning harmonised transmission tariff structures; interoperability 
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rules; network security and reliability rules; network connection rules; third-party 
access rules; data exchange and settlement rules; operational procedures in an 
emergency; rules for trading; transparency rules; and energy efficiency regarding gas 
networks.” Distinctive regulations now existed to govern the most significant issues 
encountered in cross-border transactions between suppliers, traders, transmissions 
companies, and distributors. Regulatory authorities could now access concrete bodies 
of law to solve cross-border issues rather than merely succumbing to the forces of 
energy conglomerates. 
In fact, only four states had followed the necessary legislative steps to ratify 
the Directive, and they had not even carried out the steps fully. As of 2015, a great 
deal of vertical integration still exists, as countries have failed to implement 
unbundling regulations or have just been slow to do so. This failure to ratify and 
implement unbundling regulations is not because these countries or companies lack 
the necessary resources to enact this legislation, but instead, it is simply a result of 
their blatant refusal to comply. For instance, “even where Member States have 
adopted the unbundling provisions this does not necessarily mean that network 
operators comply with them as the Sector Inquiry has demonstrated that incentives for 
preferential treatment within vertically integrated operators remain. Despite the efforts 
of the Commission to change the structure of the market, a number of factors must be 
addressed at the regional, national, and international levels in order for any real 
change to be accomplished” (Duncan, 2015). 
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3. THE ROAD SO FAR 
3.1. Greek Natural Gas Market and Transmission System (NNGS) 
Natural gas production of Greece is slim. The South Kavala natural gas field, 
located in the Kavala Gulf of the Aegean Sea, produced 5 mcm in 2012. Natural gas 
demand has risen steadily from the early 1980’s and stabilized at 4.4 bcm (12 mcm/d) 
in 2012. In 2011, transformation represents about 61% of total consumption, 
succeeded by industry (24%) and residential use (9%). 
The Greek National Natural Gas System (NNGS) consists of the main high 
pressure natural gas transmission pipeline from the Greek-Bulgarian borders to Attica 
(Elefsina location Patima), the high-pressure divisions linking various areas of the 
country with the main pipeline, such as the branch connecting the main pipeline with 
the Greek-Turkish borders, the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility at Revythoussa 
island, as well as other facilities and infrastructure that service the entire Gas 
Transmission System. 
“Natural Gas is injected to the NNGS through three Entry Points, Sidirokastro, 
located at the Greek-Bulgarian borders, Kipi Evros, located at the Greek-Turkish 
borders, and Agia Triada, on the coast opposite to Revythoussa island” (Sifnaios, 
2014). “In 2013 more than 66% of the gas imported into the country came from 
Russia and 18% was imported from Turkey. The remaining 16% was imported as 
LNG at the island of Revithoussa and was injected into the transmission system from 
the Agia Triada entry point” (RAE, 2014). 
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Figure 3.1. Gas infrastructure of Greece (Sifnaios, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.2. Share of natural gas import sources, 2007-2013 (RAE, 2014). 
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“Key elements of Greece’s overall policy on natural gas security are 
diversification of supply sources, establishment of market-based demand measures, 
reduction of the LNG delivery lead times during periods of high demand, signing of 
new contracts for gas supply as well as development of the natural gas transmission 
system (updating the existing LNG terminal, a new pipeline and an underground gas 
storage facility). The transmission system operator (TSO), DESFA, plays a major role 
in emergency planning and managing crisis situations. Interruption of gas supply for 
customers based on a priority list, fuel switching at power stations and the use of gas 
reserves stored at the LNG terminal are foreseen as emergency response measures in a 
gas crisis. In order for new gas-fired power producers to be granted with a production 
license, they are obliged to hold at least five days of backup reserves of alternative 
fuel. Five thermal power generation units, which use gas as primary fuel, can switch 
to an alternative fuel.”(IEA) 
“Besides DEPA S.A., which supplies gas at the wholesale and the retail level, 
and the self-importing/self-consuming eligible customers mentioned above, there are 
three distribution companies (known as EPAs), which supply gas to non-eligible 
customers, each being a monopoly in a specific geographical area: EPA Attica, EPA 
Thessaloniki and EPA Thessalia. DEPA S.A. owns 51% of each EPA, thus, by the 
domination principle, DEPA holds at the retail level the same share as in the 
wholesale market. 
In October 2011, the EPA Attica changed its methodology for setting 
customer tariffs, the previous one linking natural gas prices to the price of oil. From 1 
October 2011, the EPA Attica pricing methodology is cost-based and is similar to 
those of EPA Thessaloniki and EPA Thessalia. Natural gas prices for residential, 
professional and commercial consumers result from the summing up of: a) the cost of 
gas supply, b) the distribution margins and c) taxes. 
During the 2010-2012 period, when there was considerable competition in 
imports of natural gas in Greece, the share of DEPA gas imports corresponded to 
about ninety percent (90%) of total annual imports. However, in 2013, the share of 
DEPA gas imports reached ninety-nine percent (99%) of total annual imports. Only 
two (2) other companies (one gas supplier and one big industrial consumer), beyond 
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DEPA, imported natural gas in the country in 2013, representing the remaining one 
percent (1%) of total imports. 
By 2014 gas market was still organised on the basis of bilateral contracts 
between suppliers and eligible customers; no organised wholesale market exists yet. 
Transactions that have been recorded so far involve a) wholesale trading of LNG 
quantities in-tank, b) resale of gas between eligible customers, and c) DEPA’s 
electronic natural gas supply auctions” (RAE, 2014). 
“The companies that have been granted a Gas Supply Authorisation until 2015 
are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Gas supply authorisations registry (RAE, 2014). 
No. Company 
1 DEPA S.A. 
2 PROMETHEUS GAS S.A. 
3 EGL HELLAS S.A. 
4 M AND M GAS CO 
5 HELLAS POWER S.A. 
6 EDISON HELLAS S.A. 
7 ENIMEX S.A. 
8 TERNA S.A. 
9 HERON THERMOELECTRIC S.A. 
10 GUNVOR INTERNATIONAL B.V. 
 
Furthermore, according to the Gas Law, any person wishing to become a 
shipper has to be registered in the National Natural Gas System Registry, in order to 
conclude a (transmission or LNG) contract with the TSO. In 2013, twenty six  
companies were officially registered as potential users of the NNGS, five of which 
were active in 2013” (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2. “Companies officially registered as NNGS users (RAE, 2014). 
No. User’s Name Classification 
1 ALUMINIUM S.A. Eligible Customer 
2 MOTOR OIL (HELLAS) S.A. Eligible Customer 
3 PUBLIC POWER CORPORATION S.A. (DEI) Eligible Customer 
4 EDISON S.p.A. Third Party 
5 PUBLIC GAS CORPORATION S.A. (DEPA) Natural Gas 
Supplier 
6 ELPEDISON POWER S.A. Eligible Customer 
7 ELFE S.A. Eligible Customer 
8 PROMETHEUS GAS S.A. Third Party 
9 HERON THERMOELECTRIC S.A. Eligible Customer 
10 HERON THERMOELECTRIC STATION OF VIOTIA S.A. Eligible Customer 
11 PROTERGIA S.A. Eligible Customer 
12 M AND M GAS CO Natural Gas 
Supplier 
13 KORINTHOS POWER S.A. Eligible Customer 
14 E.ON RUHRGAS AG Third Party 
15 STATOIL ASA Third Party 
16 EDISON HELLAS S.A. Natural Gas 
Supplier 
17 TRANS ADRIATIC PIPELINE A.G. Third Party 
18 GASTRADE S.A. Third Party 
19 LARCO S.A. Third Party 
20 ELPE S.A. Third Party 
21 TERNA S.A. Natural Gas 
Supplier 
22 ELVAL S.A. Eligible Customer 
23 SOVEL S.A. Eligible Customer 
24 SIDENOR STEEL INDUSTRY S.A. Eligible Customer 
25 FULGOR GREEK ELECTRIC CABLES S.A. Eligible Customer 
26 HELLENIC HALYVOURGIA S.A. Eligible Customer” 
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3.2. Legislation 
The “legislative and regulatory framework of the Greek natural gas sector has 
been significantly modified over recent years, through the transposition of the EU gas 
market Directives into Greek law. However, it should be mentioned that Greece 
benefited from derogation of the implementation of the second EU Gas market 
Directive (2003/55 EC) due to the infant gas market. The Law 3175/2003 introduced 
the primary measures for the liberalization process since the market was opened for 
the gas-fired power producers and cogenerators with an annual consumption of more 
than 25 million cubic meters (mcm). This meant that over 60% of the market had been 
liberalised by 2009” (Fafaliou and Polemis, 2009). 
“DESFA was established in March 2007 after the completion of the legal 
unbundling procedure of the Public Gas Corporation of Greece” (DEPA S.A.). 
DESFA owns and operates the Greek Transmission Network and Revithoussa LNG 
Terminal in accordance with the Third Energy Package. It has been recently certified 
as an Independent Transmission Operator. 
DEPA’s share capital extents to 991.2 million Euros. 35% is owned by the 
Hellenic Petroleum S.A. company and the rest 65% belongs to the Greek State. The 
Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) lies within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Development. 
TPA rules to the LNG terminal, along with the rules for accessing the Greek 
Natural Gas Transmission System, are set in the Network Code which was approved 
in April 2010. Third party access to the NGTS during the transitional period (until the 
approval of the System Code of Operations), followed the terms and provisions of 
Ministerial Decision No. 1227 (Official Gazette Β΄ 135/05.02.2007), establishing the 
procedure for the conclusion and the contents of the standard transmission contract for 
the access and use of the Transmission System.  
TPA tariffs were determined by Ministerial Decision 4955/2006 following a 
proposal by RAE. The access conflicts which took place in late 2009 and early 2010 
at Revithoussa LNG terminal, described below, triggered the final approval of the 
Network Code. In this regard, on 12th January 2010, DESFA issued a press release 
clarifying the situation on natural gas market deregulation.  
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The “most important provisions of the national legislation, from which arise 
the competences of the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) and DESFA S.A. 
regarding the security of natural gas supply, are quoted below” (RAE, 2009): 
“RAE is responsible for monitoring the country’s security of natural gas 
supply. In this framework, RAE: 
1. Recommends the necessary measures and sets forth suggestions for the security of 
supply, taking under consideration data provided by the TSO, the customers and the 
natural gas companies. 
2. Prepares yearly this report, which summarises the relevant conclusions and 
recommendations. 
The TSO, as exclusively responsible for the operation, maintenance, 
development and utilization of the National Natural Gas System, among other things: 
1. Ensures the prompt and efficient handling of emergencies. For this reason, they 
prepare an Emergency and Crisis Management Plan. This plan is approved by the 
Minister of Development, following RAE’s opinion. 
2. Compiles an interruption of natural gas supply schedule for customers, in the event 
of an emergency, which is approved by the Minister of Development, following 
RAE’s opinion. 
3. Enters into contracts with major customers for the interruption of natural gas supply 
by priority, in the event of an emergency. This contract is signed mandatorily with the 
electricity production licensees who maintain stocks of alternative fuel. 
4. In the event of an emergency, interrupts by priority: 
a. Unterruptible customers . 
b. Other customers, according to the interruption schedule. 
5. Issues orders to Suppliers who supply not only Major Customers, so that, in the 
event of an emergency, they shall supply continuously natural gas to customers that 
are not Major Customers. For the fulfillment of this obligation, the aforementioned 
Suppliers are fully compensated, as provided for in their licenses. 
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6. Collects a security of supply levy from the Users”. 
On 13th April 2010, DESFA announced the publication of the Network Code 
by RAE (i.e. Greek Law 3428/2005 as amended and in force, the Ministerial Decree 
No. Δ1/Α/5346/2010 “Network Code” Government Gazette Β' 379/01.04.2010 and 
the decision of the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) No. 611/2010 for the 
approval of the Standard Transportation Agreement (STA) and Standard LNG 
Terminal Usage Agreement (SLTUA)). 
Law 4001/2011 brought EU Directives involving rules for domestic markets in 
electricity and the obligatory further liberalization of domestic EU member states 
natural gas markets into national legislation. On this ground, and moving one step 
further, this legislation backed the reforms in the Greek energy sector, mostly 
consisting of partial privatization of state‐controlled energy companies. Amongst its 
main provisions, the law stipulated the unbundling of the system operators and 
enhanced the role of the independent regulator regarding energy security, licensing, 
monitoring of the market and consumer protection. The previously mentioned law 
was afterwards amended in December 2011, by a Governmental Legislative Act, to 
grant for every model, Ownership Unbundling or ITO, to be pursued in the case of 
DEPA S.A. and DESFA S.A (Table 3.3). This amendment was submitted in order to 
fulfill the government’s intention to privatize the incumbent and in the prospect of 
permitting potential investors to acquire one or both of the above companies. A 
second amendment of Law 4001/2011, which was performed by two consecutive 
Government Legislative Acts, occurred in November of 2012, “in order to introduce 
more specific provisions on the implementation of either the Ownership Unbundling 
or the ITO model, to accommodate the DEPA/DESFA S.A. privatization process. 
Consequently, the TSO’s certification procedure started only at the end of December 
2012, when DESFA S.A. submitted an application to RAE to be certified as an 
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO model).” (RAE) 
In 2013 RAE adopted the following decisions on the preliminary TSO 
Certification of DESFA, under the ownership of DEPA: 
1. Decision 184/2013 on the “Approval of DESFA’s Compliance Program, in 
accordance with the provisions of Law 4001/2011”. 
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2. Decision 199A/2013, on the “Approval of the Supervisory Board and of the 
Compliance Officer of the Company “Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator 
(DESFA) SA” . 
3. Decision No. 199B/2013, on the Certification of the Company “Hellenic Gas 
Transmission System Operator (DESFA) SA”, as an Independent Natural Gas 
Transmission Operator, which was the preliminary certification decision, in 
accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2009/73/EC and Article 64 of Law 
4001/2011.  
Table 3.3. Incumbent natural gas market structure after wholesale unbundling (Bikos, 
2014). 
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4. THE THIRD GREEK BAILOUT PACKAGE 
4.1. Introduction 
On 14th August 2015 the Government passed a new law introducing radical 
changes in many aspects of the economy, most notably bringing tax, pensions and 
other substantial burdens on the Greek taxpayer in implementation of the 
Government’s obligation towards its lenders to introduce new cost-cutting measures 
in exchange for a further loan. This law is commonly known as the “Third 
Memorandum” between Greece and its lenders, and it contains the most austere 
measures seen so far. In it, the Government also included a new law on the 
liberalization of the natural gas distribution sector in Greece. Such liberalization was 
one of the requirements imposed by the country’s lenders as early as 2014 and its 
provisions had undergone a public consultation before the change of Government in 
January 2015.  The law, as enacted, includes very few changes in the area of natural 
gas from the bill put forward to the public consultation last year. 
According to Section 4, referring to growth, competitiveness and investment, 
it is mentioned that “Greece will design and implement a wide range of reforms in 
labour markets and product markets (including energy) that not only ensure full 
compliance with EU requirements, but which also aim at achieving European best 
practices” (Kolia, 2015). 
Target of the European internal natural gas market completion is the creation 
of an open energy market which will provide every consumer the option to choose 
freely his natural gas supplier, every supplier to supply energy to his customer at his 
will and to the economy to use technologically new energy infrastructure in order to 
minimize energy cost at each country’s production sector. 
However there are still obstacles in European energy market development, 
mainly in the grid access, different levels of energy market completion, differences in 
consumer prices, in free supplier choice and so on. 
In this framework, Greece tries to follow European union model with the third 
Target model in natural gas. 
Specifically Greece aims at adapting to other state members in terms of the 
retail natural gas market. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to unbundle the 
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already functional distribution companies of natural gas (EPAs) which operate against 
the existing regulatory networks framework because of European Commission’s 
deviations implemented during their installment. A similar unbundling occurred 
recently at the distribution of high pressure natural gas with the creation of DESFA. 
In order to achieve this goal the modification of law 4001/2011 is necessary. 
The regulated natural gas model in all EU member states implements the 
unbundling of retail sector, by the operation of two companies, Operation and 
Distribution. Distribution functions with objective rules securing TPA in the network 
and a full market opening with a stepping abolishment of supply limitations. 
Targets of the already proceeding unbundling are the achievement of 
competitive natural gas prices and the free selection of supplier. It is something 
similar to the successful competitive function of communications sector.  
Extreme caution during the unbundling shall be given to the role of DEPA in 
the developing market as a crucial factor of ensuring the proper natural gas market 
function. 
The liberalization of natural gas retail market shall be on its own a major step 
towards increasing competitiveness in retail and market. That’s why the liberalization 
of natural gas retail market as soon as possible is the main target of the amendment of 
law 4001/2001. 
The liberalization of natural gas retail market can begin at early 2016 and 
complete gradually until 2018. The unbundling of natural gas distribution and DESFA 
took a similar time period to complete. During the unbundling of today’s era EPAs, 
companies transform to EDAs and companies of network transmission manager. 
This unbundling is mainly logistic and because of that it will not be a burden 
to the state budget. Any claims that may occur from the exclusive right of natural gas 
supply that EPAs used-wrongly-to perform and the expiry of their usage licenses 
before the completion of the licenses’ time limit shall be dealt in the framework of 
EPA unbundling negotiations. 
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4.2. The changes brought forward regarding distribution functions and 
ownership of distribution systems 
The new law (4336/2015) provides for the abolishment of the existing 
exclusive rights of the EPAs to supply and operate their respective distribution 
systems. The EPAs will no longer have a distribution function and will spin-off and 
transfer their distribution function to new companies by January 2017; such 
companies will be functionally and legally different from the EPAs, but will be in the 
hands of the same shareholders as the EPAs. The new companies, called EDAs, will 
operate the relevant distribution systems with the first right to expand their network. 
They will be distribution system operators and will operate under a distribution 
license and a license to operate a distribution system of a 20-year duration. Such right 
is however subject to revocation and third-party operators may be allowed to build 
independent systems within the EDA distribution systems if the EDAs do not fulfill a 
customer’s request for connection within 18 months from the scheduled time under 
their development programs. The provision is rather vague and does not clarify what 
happens if a connection is scheduled to be constructed at a point in time beyond the 
first 5-year development program and therefore not included in the development 
program.  
The ownership of the distribution systems that EPAs have built will be vested 
to DEPA S.A. and the EDAs will operate such systems under license and without 
paying fees to DEPA for the use of the assets. The ownership of the new systems that 
the EDAs will build will be vested on the EDAs.  
The EDAs will be functionally independent from the vertically integrated 
parent companies, pursuant to the provisions similar to the unbundling obligations set 
out in article 26 of the Third Natural Gas Directive (EU Dir. 2009/73) applicable for 
distribution companies. 
DEPA is also vested with the right to set up a new EDA (as a spin-off of its 
distribution functions) which shall obtain a distribution license for areas covered 
under the vague description “the rest of Greece”; it can also set up more EDAs which 
will receive separate territories from the above description (Kolia, 2015).  
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4.3. The changes brought forward by the new law regarding supply to Eligible 
and Non- Eligible Customers 
The supply to Non-Eligible customers is performed by the old EPAs pursuant 
to regulated tariffs approved by RAE. The EPAs may also supply Eligible Customers, 
but the tariffs should clearly not allow cross-subsidisation between Eligible and Non-
Eligible customers. The supply of Eligible customers by the EPAs will not be 
regulated in terms of prices, but it will need to comply with the provisions of a supply 
licence and a supply code approved by RAE, as will be the case for all other suppliers 
too. RAE has the power to impose caps on allowed profits to suppliers in case those 
prices are set at levels not justified by the conditions in the local or international 
market and fair competition. 
In any event, all customers within the EPA territories (household and non-
household) shall become Eligible on 1 January 2018; note that industrial customers 
with an annual consumption over 2.2 GWh  are already eligible, and non-industrial 
customers with such consumption will also become eligible by 1 January 2017. The 
relevant article in the new law is not well drafted and seems, probably by oversight, to 
exclude from the definition of Eligible Customers the customers that have already 
become Eligible prior to the enactment of the new law. Furthermore, the article of the 
new law is unclear as to what happens to non-eligible customers who are located 
outside the territories of the EPAs. The bill provided that all customers located outside 
the territories of the EPAs would be considered Eligible Customers from the entry 
into force of the law; such provision is missing from the law as enacted. 
The EPAs in their position as supply companies shall compete freely with 
other suppliers for the supply of Eligible Customers; DEPA S.A. will remain a 51% 
shareholder of both the new EDAs and the EPAs, therefore competing with the latter 
over the supply of Eligible Customers.  
It must be noted that until the spin-off, the EPAs (and thereafter the new 
EDAs) are themselves characterised as Non-Eligible Customers, having the obligation 
to purchase their gas needs from one of their shareholders, DEPA, at least up to a 
level of their contracted requirements in 2010 and insofar as such gas is used to 
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supply Non-Eligible Customers. This obligation will remain for as long the EPAs 
supply Non-Eligible Customers, i.e. probably until 1 January 2018. 
There is a further provision that reduces the power of the EPAs to supply Non-
Eligible Customers for the restricted period while they remain Non-Eligible; 
customers located within the territories of the current EPAs may apply to be 
connected to the distribution system within a period of 3 months. If EPA (or EDA as 
the case may be) cannot proceed to the connection within this time period, the 
customer may seek supply of natural gas from other providers, i.e. the customer will 
become an Eligible Customer. This provision clearly puts the EPAs in a difficult 
position, since they are in fact obliged to proceed to connections within 3 months 
otherwise they lose the customer from a supply view point; it is not clear however 
who will proceed to connection in terms of distribution works to the customer, as the 
EPAs in that case have a larger timeframe within which to construct such connection 
(Kolia, 2015).  
 
4.4. The changes brought forward by the new law regarding tariffs and 
transitional law 
 Article 87 of act 4001/2011, as amended by act 4336/2015, states the tariff 
regulation of both eligible and non-eligible customers. Especially, RAE is the one 
authorized for the issue of regulated tariffs for the non-eligible customers in 
accordance to EPAs and DEPA proposal. In order to grant these regulated tariffs RAE 
has to follow certain rules, such as the principle of non-discrimination between non-
eligible customers and the exclusion of cross-subsidies. The tariffs should also 
guarantee the return of the real supply cost plus a proper profit for the EPAs. In 
specific cases, and only for a limited period, RAE is authorized to set a maximum 
profit margin to suppliers. 
 The opening of the retail natural gas market furthermore requires transitional 
law which is included in the new legal framework. RAE will specifically construct the 
tariff regulation and the code for the distribution network operation in accordance 
with DEPA’s and the already existing EPA’s proposals, at their capacity as existing 
network operators. After this, RAE will grant the network tariffs in DEPA’s and the 
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current bundled EPA’s proposal. Before the grant of such regulations, act 4336/2015 
arranges that network users shall pay to the network operator for access to the grid. 
 Last, after the legal and functional unbundling of EPAs and DEPA, the already 
existing distribution licenses they own will be replaced by new distribution and 
operation network licenses given to the EDAs. Natural gas supply licenses will be 
granted to EPAs accordingly. Until the new supply licenses are issued, act 4336/2015 
states that bundled EPAs are free to supply eligible customers as well as customers 
living outside the geographical areas mentioned specifically in their existing licenses. 
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5. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR 
It is believed that the liberalization of the natural gas market has as main 
outcome the increasing competition on the market. Specific aspects of the natural gas 
industry inevitably drew the attention of the regulators, particularly the monopoly 
forms, such as the pipeline systems. Given the long financial cycles of the industry, it 
is particularly vulnerable to regulatory changes which can be a source of risk and, 
therefore, cost. Such uncertainty can undermine investment. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) states claim that, when it comes to 
formulating energy policies “the establishment of free and open markets is a 
fundamental point of departure. In order to reconcile a consistent energy policy with a 
commitment to markets, regulation must evolve to ensure that markets deliver long-
term energy strategies. A good example of adaptive energy regulation can be seen in 
the United States gas market, which has a long tradition of relying on iterative 
methods in regulation. Liberalised markets require the role of governments to be 
redefi ned. It does not mean there is no role for governments” (IEA, 2006). 
In the early 2000s, for the natural gas sector the idea of a massive restructuring 
of the gas market through its liberalization appeared, with the stated aim of lowering 
costs and increasing the quality of gas supply. Analyzing the last 15 years, it can be 
concluded that the institutions responsible for the operation of the market have the 
greatest responsibility in making it inoperative. 
In general, the liberalization of the natural gas market relies on the principles 
of competition, transparency and fairness. Gas market liberalization targets were the 
following (Chisalita, 2015): 
1. Low gas price 
2. Cost reduction at the companies operating on the gas market; 
3. Consumer protection 
6. Elimination of cross subsidies and non-specific costs 
5. Increasing professionalism 
6. Increase of productivity 
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7. Increased safety in the operation of natural gas facilities 
8. Elimination of political or group influences 
9. Establishment of an independent institution to operate on the natural gas market 
10. Ensuring a minimum level of energy security 
When it comes to theory, liberalization will focus on maximizing efficiency, 
cutting down costs and charging the lowest price for costumers. Particularly in natural 
gas sector, a competitive market will make sure that monopoly power will not be 
practiced by a single leading company. In the areas where natural monopoly takes 
place – especially in aspects of network ownership – this has to be dealt in such a way 
in order to assist reasonable charges for transportation and the basic regulation for use 
of the network. This regulatory framework will ensure that market players and market 
(particularly price) signals to mandate commercial decisions, efficiency will be 
maximized and costs decreased, meaning lower prices for the customers. 
In an authentically liberalized natural gas market, the producers will be free to 
hand over natural gas during the time period they prefer, which when prices maximize 
will end up to a supplies surplus leading to price fall. The downstream area will be 
filled up by a large number of companies such as transporters, shippers, suppliers, 
distributors and network operators. The entire market will function under the umbrella 
of legislation and regulation, which will ensure that every player works while 
securing his obligations. The modification of these obligations will be given to the 
national regulators who will function with the instructions of the Governments. 
Consequently, “the increase in the number of competitors in the market allows 
for the most efficient price allocation, potentially driving down prices. For example, 
an advantage of a competitive market is that it permits negotiation between retail 
electric providers (REPs) and consumers  presumably, the resulting negotiations result 
in pricing which is in line with the true value of any demand-side resource. 
Additionally, state conglomerates will now be competing with other companies for 
customers and will have to lower their prices. In fact, studies were conducted in the 
countries that had implemented unbundling. Furthermore, unbundling removes 
undesirable cross-subsidies between network and competitive businesses, and 
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improves retail competition. The potential exists for even greater improvement of 
wholesale competition” (Duncan, 2015). 
The “participation of a large number of players on the liberalized gas market 
will increase gas to gas competition, which in turn will stimulate the diversification of 
gas supplies. As producers will have a variety of customers instead of just one, they 
will put more effort into providing the best products and services possible. In fact, the 
direct consequences of stronger unbundling are more independent management and 
financing of the network, positively affecting performance of the network. 
Furthermore, because producers, distributors, transmission system operators, and 
retail distributors now operate independently, each unit is now able to focus more on 
its specific job. For example, the network operator will be able to focus on optimising 
its main business—the use of the network. Moreover, the increased competition will 
lead to an increased liquidity of natural gas. And this, in turn, will stimulate the 
development of the global exchange trading and financial system, which could send 
price signals allowing for the most efficient allocations of gas supplies and 
transportation capacity in times of emergency” (UNECE, 2012; Duncan, 2015). 
Arguments on these reasons continued during the last 15 years. At the 
beginning they represented the goals shared by many Greeks, subsequently because 
they have become an obligation for Greece, as an EU member. 
The separation of operations provides transparency and traceability of actions, 
the way actions are carried out in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This way of 
setting the targets are determinable in terms of space, money and time and 
subsequently determine actions that allow overcoming previous standards. 
The “persistence of long-term contracts favours the construction of major gas 
infrastructure and provides an incentive to the gas-producing countries for developing 
new resources. But long-term contracts alone may not be sufficient for developing 
new gas fields, especially when it comes to unconventional gas, which requires state-
of-the-art technology for its extraction. Therefore, producer countries need to open 
their markets for more foreign involvement to attract the needed technology. Thus, the 
liberalization of the upstream sector will become increasingly important for the 
security of gas supplies” (UNECE, 2012). 
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The “liberalization of the Greek natural gas market will create physical and 
institutional linkages between the markets in the different member states. Stronger 
market linkages between economies are generally seen as beneficial because they lead 
to lower costs of imports, better export opportunities for the producers and, in the long 
run, lower amount of spare reserves to be maintained” (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2005). 
“From an economic point of view, the liberalization of the gas sector and the 
integration of the individual member states markets into one will lead to a reduction in 
the production costs of the enterprises and the price adjustment to of the rest of the 
market players. If an enterprise fails to do so, it might find itself in a market 
dominated by its competitors. Therefore, according to UNECE (2012), the major goal 
of the natural gas market integration in the EU is not to uniformly create lower prices 
but rather to ensure that the gas prices are fair and reveal the real market conditions. 
The liberalization ensures that prices reflect the demand and supply fundamentals, 
such as the costs of production, transport and storage by allowing consumers to 
respond to them. That is why UNECE (2012) identifies that in periods of oversupply 
of gas in Europe the prices reflect only the marginal cost of supply which is low at the 
time. In the opposite situation, when there is undersupply, the prices reflect not only 
the value of the energy commodity but also the cost for investing in its supply” 
(Ivanova, 2012). 
Therefore, the increase in the number of third-party competitors countries will 
help increase interconnection capacity and also strengthen energy relationships 
between countries. First, as outside companies can now contribute to European gas 
markets, they will seek to invest in cross-border joint ventures and acquisitions. As 
their incentive to invest in cross-border transmission capacities increases, the EU 
energy infrastructure capacity will also increase. Cross-border cooperation is 
especially important in this situation, as the EU is seeking not only to liberalize its 
market, but also to create cohesion within it. It wants all Member States to follow the 
same regulatory standards in an effort to build a unified market open to competitors. 
In this specific instance, unbundling is supposed to be beneficial for the system, as it 
allows network operators to conduct their duties more cohesively. “It makes network 
regulation easier and improves network quality” (Duncan, 2015). 
Another benefit of the implementation of the Third Bailout policies referring 
to the opening of the natural gas market is greater security that is guaranteed through 
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the diversity of resources. The existence of a greater number of suppliers means that 
consumers are not beholden to one country as the sole provider of their energy needs. 
They can look outside their country for other companies to provide them with natural 
gas (Duncan, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
6. ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
According to the theory, by separating the activities in the natural gas sector, 
people and companies get specialized in a narrow field of activity, substantially 
increasing professionalism. Competition in the same sector fosters innovation and 
technical progress and leads to lower prices. This theory has not met with the practice 
in several cases (Cavaliere, 2007; Chisalita, 2015). 
The high demand for natural gas services, the reduced effort - intellectually 
and physically - to operate in the gas sector, the high prices for services have led to 
the rapid growth of the number of companies operating in the gas sector, but also 
attracted people lacking theoretical training and experience in the gas sector, from 
various other fields that have ceased or reduced their activity. Thus, thousands of 
businesses got licensed in the natural gas sector, bringing together tens of thousands 
of inexperienced people in the field. 
Some of the elements that determined professionalism to follow a downward 
curve in past years are unawareness of the natural gas sector values, lack of time for 
preparing and training of newcomers from other fields, the abolition of the 
hierarchical responsibilities, political influence. 
Productivity is a result, a consequence of efforts and not a quality or skill. 
Productivity is an excellent indicator of the ability of natural gas companies to 
achieve additional added value in conjunction with lower costs. Inventing 
productivity indicators has determined mimicking the added value and has not 
allowed costs cuts in some companies. Recent years were characterized by a paradox: 
people having knowledge were removed, retired, transferred, etc., in order to employ 
people who needed time to reach the knowledge of the ousted ones. 
People have adopted an attitude at the workplace in accordance with their own 
way of perceiving the work environment. The unstable environment has ruined 
people’s faith in values such as quality, innovation, creativity, risk taking, maintaining 
standards and attitude to work. Work has become to be regarded, in general, without 
interest, to be avoided if possible, seen as an issue without responsibility and an 
exhausting one. 
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It is believed that the separation and liberalization of some operations, while 
protection systems have multiplied, have led to a lower level of equipment safety. 
In several cases, like in the Romanian case, liberalization meant not only 
higher prices, even if they have increased almost 18 times since 2000. If we analyze 
the final structure of the price, we find out, for example, that tax increases have 
exceeded all the other components of price formation altogether. The restructuring of 
former Romgaz administration and the costs separation by the types of activities to 
identify the unjustified ones or eliminate cross subsidies, the privatization of gas 
distributors continue to raise many questions about the success of reform. Finally, we 
note that the end consumer is at least just as vulnerable as it was 15 years ago when 
the reform in the system started (Chisalita, 2015). 
In addition, long-term contracts “have favoured development of long-term, 
capital-intensive supply projects such as the North Stream, South Stream and 
Nabucco pipelines, LNG terminals (Turkey, Croatia) and intersystem connectors. 
Realization of these projects would not be possible without the insurance provided by 
long-term “take or pay” contracts. The contracts make the projects economically 
viable, with producers assured of income and suppliers able to obtain needed 
quantities of natural gas in the long run” (UNECE, 2012). 
It is believed that the liberalization of the energy markets slowly decreases the 
price of energy unit. Although, prices depend on a number of factors, it would be 
interesting to trace the pattern of the natural gas prices between in the United 
Kingdom compared to the prices in Continental Europe respectively after the 
implementation of reform policies towards liberalization. The liberalization of the 
“UK gas market took place before the European gas reform started in 1998. All the 
major changes such as the privatisation of British Gas, the establishment of the then 
regulator, the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas), which later became the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem), and the introduction of competition were agreed and 
implemented between 1986 and 1998. The unbundling of British Gas (BG) was 
initiated in 1997 and took place in several stages. First, the separation of BG activities 
resulted in the establishment of BG plc and Centrica. Next, the former transportation 
arm of BG, which had remained part of the incumbent, was transformed into BG 
Transco plc in December 1999. One year later, its demerger from BG was finalised 
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and transport services were integrated under the umbrella of Lattice Group plc. In 
2002, Lattice Group plc merged with National Grid to form National Grid Transco plc 
- the UK’s largest utility. National Grid owns and operates the gas transmission 
system throughout in UK and is also active in the gas distribution business.  Whereas 
prior to liberalization natural gas was treated as a public utility, the dominant 
institutional logic changed towards conceiving of natural gas as a commodity. Full 
competition was legally established throughout the UK by 1998. It must be noted that 
currently, the UK remains the largest market as well as the largest producer of natural 
gas in the European Union” (Haase, 2009). 
Figure 5.1 “shows the rise in wholesale natural gas prices in the UK between 
2002 and 2005 and sets this trend in relation to an averaged Continental Europe 
wholesale prices. In 2002 and 2003 the UK price was still below 20 pence per therm 
and lower than those typical in Continental Europe. The comparison of Continental 
and UK price developments shows different patterns. Whereas in Continental Europe 
the price has moderately and steadily increased, in the UK regular price peaks during 
the winter months are observed. Especially since winter 2003-04, the price has taken 
off and moved beyond 24 pence per therm to skyrocket to above 50 pence per therm 
during winter 2005-06. Since 2004, the effects of the rising wholesale prices have 
been fiercely felt by UK consumers. Households were facing an increase of 21% in 
gas bills and 15% in electricity bills during 2005. Industry also felt the effects of two 
winters of rising prices” (Haase, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.1. UK and Continental Europe wholesale gas prices, 2002-2005 (Haase, 
2009). 
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In general, large part of the push behind liberalizing Europe’s natural gas 
markets is the idea that successful liberalization means opening up gas markets, which 
will encourage more suppliers to enter the market, thus providing greater energy 
security and choice for the customers. In order to determine whether liberalization 
(and the theorized increase in energy security), a number of economic factors can be 
analyzed. For instance, if liberalization worked, that would mean more competition 
and thus lower prices, according to basic microeconomic theory. Along with prices, 
other economic indicators of success include market concentration levels, percentage 
of customers switching gas providers, the length of contracts, and effect of ownership 
unbundling on prices. In addition to raw economic data, evaluations of unbundling 
and the independence of network operators contribute to determining whether 
liberalization has been successful in increasing energy security. While lowering prices 
for natural gas was a central goal of the liberalization effort, at this point, prices had 
not decreased by 2009; rather, prices had been increased steadily. One can reasonably 
conclude that the sharp drop in 2009 in both gas and oil prices was largely the result 
of the global recession that led a downturn in economic activity and thus less demand 
for energy. In a report on the progress of the internal market for gas, the European 
Commission acknowledges the increase in prices, which “suggests perhaps an 
insufficient level of market integration.” Increasing rather than decreasing prices 
suggest that liberalization has not been effective and a signal that increased 
competition is not taking place. However, more factors than prices need to be 
analyzed to determine whether liberalization has been successful (Yu, 2011). 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 Europe's “energy sector is in the midst of a major transformation. According 
to the EU Energy Roadmap for 2050 gas will be critical for the transformation of the 
energy system. Substitution of coal (and oil) with gas in the short to medium term 
could help to reduce emissions with existing technologies until at least 2030 or 2035. 
Although gas demand in the residential sector, for example, might drop by a quarter 
until 2030 due to several energy efficiency measures in the housing sector, it will stay 
high in other sectors such as the power sector over a longer period. The EU gas 
market needs more integration, more liquidity, more diversity of supply sources and 
more storage capacity, for gas to maintain its competitive advantages as a fuel for 
electricity generation. Long term gas supply contracts may continue to be necessary to 
underwrite investments in gas production and transmission infrastructures. Greater 
flexibility in price formula, moving away from pure oil-indexation, will be needed if 
gas is to remain a competitive fuel for electricity generation” (EU, 2011). 
 EU gas and electricity sectors “are moving from public monopolies into 
competitive private companies in liberalised markets. European market liberalization 
aimed to break vertical integration in the gas industry and introduce competition by 
requiring each country to implement the following: 1. Unbundling potentially 
competitive activities of the gas industry (production, imports, wholesale and retail 
sale of gas) from those segments of the gas chain characterized by a natural or de 
facto monopoly (transmission, storage and distribution networks), 2. Third Party 
Access (TPA) to essential facilities (not only transmission and distribution networks 
but also liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and storage facilities) which dominant 
players continue to operate, 3. Liberalization on the demand side, by allowing 
consumer switching. According to the applicable rules Member States must make safe 
that the operators of storage facilities are truly independent. Member States have the 
possibility to follow the model of detailed regulation of the third party access to the 
facilities (like the right to access to network infrastructure) or to choose the model of 
negotiated access. In light of the above storage capacity will be available for leasing 
to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis for the undisturbed supply of their 
customers.” (Pavia University, 2012) 
 The Third Bailout Package provides an incentive that involves the following 
secondary measures: 
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1. Breaking up of the monopoly of the three existing Gas Distribution and Supply 
Companies (EPAs) in Attica, Thessaloniki and Thessaly 
2. Reformation of the existing EPAs in to Gas Distribution Companies (EDAs) 
3. Repeal of the exclusive gas supply agreements between the three EPAs and the big 
“Eligible Customers” with the State Gas Company (DEPA) 
4. Introduction of a Gas Distribution Network Code 
5. Determination of the entities which are eligible to be granted with a license to 
operate and manage gas distribution networks and the obligations and duties of a Gas 
Distribution Network Operator 
6. Determination of the content of the Gas Distribution License and of the terms and 
conditions for its issuance 
 Within this framework, DEPA and EPAs undertake the obligations of keeping 
separate accounts for each of the companies’ activities and submission for approval to 
the RAE of the principles and rules to be applied with regard to the accounting 
unbundling of the companies’ activities. Legal and operational unbundling of the 
activity of the operation of the gas distribution network from the rest of the 
companies’ activities has to be implemented by January 1, 2017. The difficulties 
arising are the separation of the gas distribution network operation activity from the 
exclusive gas supply activity of the three EPAs and the compensation of the foreign 
EPAs’ shareholders by the Greek State due to the revocation of the special rights 
which had been granted to EPAs for a time period of thirty years, i.e. until 2030, on 
the basis of a relevant derogation decision of the European Commission.  
 The targets of the Greek Third Bailout Package, referring to the natural gas 
market, are defined as following: 
1. Finalization of the liberalization of the gas distribution market 
2. Eligibility of gas consumers located within the geographical territories of the 
existing EPAs to select their gas supplier 
3. Gradual increase of the current number of Eligible Customers by widening the 
eligibility criteria by January 2018 
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4. Activation of entities in the local energy market by offering bundled packages for 
the supply of gas and electricity (from a single supplier) in accordance with the 
relevant model already in force in other European countries. 
 Greek natural gas market has remained a closed market and implementation of 
its opening, begun in 2010, steps towards liberalization were quite slow in comparison 
to other EU countries. It is believed that the introduction of quick unbundling may 
also even result in increased regulatory oversight of a nation’s gas and electrical 
markets. Sometimes the unbundling process is approached in an overly liberal manner 
and introduced too quickly. For instance, a state may order the dismantling of 
vertically integrated market structures without instituting proper regulatory measures 
in order to guard against potential market abuse. As a result, the newly unbundled 
organization may continue to engage in anti-competitive market behavior, albeit in 
different forms. Eventually, this behavior will begin to cause major problems in the 
market and the government will be forced to step in, taking drastic steps to prevent 
harmful actions and leading to a situation of potentially destructive overregulation 
(Duncan, 2015). 
  Despite the overwhelming amount of rhetoric portraying liberalization as a 
method to increase energy security and decrease prices, it is clear that this has not 
happened. The three Directives in 1998, 2003 and 2009 have not been successful in 
liberalizing the natural gas market, as evidenced by increasing prices, high market 
concentration, low rates of customers switching suppliers and analyses that argue 
unbundling and regulatory are not effective. Efforts to explicitly increase energy 
security include three major proposed pipelines that are exempt from third-party 
access and unbundling. All the major projects designed to increase energy security are 
contradictory to liberalization principles (Yu, 2011). 
 Therefore, the question imposed in such as multifactor topic is if the reforms 
will be beneficial for the consumer, whether he might be a household or industry. 
Taxation is, of course, an independent factor that greatly increases the cost of the 
energy unit, but, according to the theoretical concept of the liberalization process, in 
long term deregulation, or better, the re-regulation of the natural gas market will result 
in the reduction of the operational cost. This is to be questioned as the transaction 
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costs arise due to the future horizontal structure of the transmission network, divided 
to sectors of different operations.  
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